Molyneux&#8217;s Puzzle: Philosophical, Biological and Experimental Aspects of an Open Problem by Ferretti, Gabriele
 
APhEx 19, 2019 (ed. Vera Tripodi) 
Ricevuto il: 25/10//2017 
Accettato il: 14/5/2018 
Redattori: Andrea Borghini & Matteo Morganti 
 
Periodico	  On-­‐line	  /	  ISSN	  2036-­‐9972	  	  
	  
 
 
 
N°	  19,	  2019	  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   
O P E N  P R O B L E M S  
Molyneux’s Puzzle: Philosophical, Biological and 
Experimental Aspects of an Open Problem 
Gabriele Ferretti 
Can a subject born blind, who learnt to discriminate specific shapes by using 
touch immediately recognize, in the case in which her/his vision is suddenly 
restored, the same shapes placed before her/his eyes by using vision? This is 
the famous Molyneux’s puzzle. This paper explains why such a question still 
represents a significant open problem for both philosophers and vision 
scientists. The paper will focus on the following crucial aspects concerning the 
investigation of the problem: (i) the interpretation of the question; (ii) the 
possibility of sight restoration from blindness, in relation to (ii a) the biological 
issues we must face when trying to restore sight successfully and (ii b) the 
experimental issues we must face when trying to test whether sight has been 
successfully restored. The analysis of these three important aspects of the 
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problem at stake here will lead us to understand what we can (and what we 
cannot) do at the moment, when trying to answer to this question. This will be 
possible by tackling the problem from an interdisciplinary perspective, in the 
light of what we know about vision from ophthalmology, visual neuroscience, 
biology, phenomenology and analytic philosophy of vision. 
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1. Introduction 
You’re going for a walk and you put your keys, your wallet, and your phone 
inside your bag. As you are walking, your phone rings. You decide to pick up. 
To do so, you don’t need to look into the bag. Tactile exploration suffices to 
realize where the phone lies.  
This familiar situation suggests something important about cross-modal 
associations: touch and vision are related so deeply that we can effortlessly be 
entertained with the shape of the phone in two different sense modalities. 
Sometimes, the cross-modal association is accidental. When you sniff an olive 
in your hands, there is a sense in which you can tactilely recognize that the 
object you are sniffing is the same you are touching: the olive. There is no strict 
link between this particular odor and that particular shape. Perceptual learning 
structures this form of arbitrary association. With cross-modal recognition of 
forms concerning vision and touch things are different. Touch delivers the same 
shapes we explore through vision: we can be acquainted with a shape through 
both sense modalities. Shapes can manifest, one might say, cross-modally: in 
vision and in touch. 
How can vision and touch be so closely related? A way to investigate the 
question is to ask whether the cross-modal relation of vision and touch requires 
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perceptual learning in order to be performed or whether, conversely, touch and 
vision are bound prior to and independently of any form of perceptual learning. 
Such an investigation remains, at the moment, an open problem, captured by 
the famous Molyneux’s puzzle (MP): can a subject born blind who learnt to 
discriminate specific shapes by using touch, immediately recognize, in the case 
in which her/his vision is suddenly restored, the same shapes placed before 
her/his eyes by using vision (Degenaar and Lokhorst 2014; Glenney 2012, 
2018)? This paper explains why MP still represents a significant open problem 
for both philosophers and vision scientists. 
MP could be regarded as a genuinely philosophical question about the 
nature of perceptual experience, i.e. about the nature of our capacity to entertain 
the same perceptual content, a shape, across different modalities. Philosophers 
embracing a naturalistic perspective agree that, in order to answer this 
philosophical question, we can rely on the empirical results from vision science 
based on appropriate experimental settings in which subjects with properly 
restored vision are asked to visually judge the shapes they were able to 
discriminate tactually when they were blind. 
However, a question related to the biological nature of vision stands in the 
way of our experimental investigation: can we successfully restore vision (and 
if so, to what extent)? To answer such a question we must build an appropriate 
experimental condition. We need to understand both whether vision can be 
successfully restored and whether we can build a reliable empirical test to 
provide evidence that, with respect to the biological constraints over vision, 
vision is restored. Only such a test would prove whether the cross-modal 
matching is already present or not. 
Now, several conceptual and empirical problems stand in the way not only 
of a possible solution to this puzzle, but also of a proper realization of the 
conditions we need to obtain in order to properly realize the experimental 
setting needed to test the puzzle. Furthermore, we still do not know whether the 
challenges in reaching this experimental scenario, an enterprise that is ruled by 
the biological constraints of such an attempt, is a matter of principle or, rather, 
depends on our present knowledge of the biology of vision. But we saw that 
investigating such an impossibility at the experimental and at the biological 
level is crucial for the conceptual evaluation of the philosophical puzzle, at least 
from a broadly naturalistic perspective. 
 G. Ferretti – Molyneux’s Puzzle 
	  
 
 
Periodico	  On-­‐line	  /	  ISSN	  2036-­‐9972	     
  
Also, several attempts to reach the experimental scenario needed to answer 
the MP have failed, as we shall see, for different reasons. One reason used in 
support of a negative answer to MP – i.e. as to whether such a cross-modal 
match is possible before perceptual learning - turned out to be, however, only a 
negative answer to the biological question concerning whether, in the specific 
experimental case at stake, vision was properly restored. The basis of error was 
that the experimental test was poorly designed to assess the effectiveness of 
such a restoration. Further challenges include a need to define what ‘visual 
restoration’ means, vision being a very complex phenomenon. This suggests 
that the problem is open in a hierarchical manner.  
The task of this paper is to make the reader able to appreciate the 
distinction between answers to MP itself and the methodology used to 
appropriately evaluate them in order to reach a satisfying answer to MP. I’ll 
offer a general analysis of the main specific problems we need to resolve in 
order to properly be in the conditions of trying to answer MP. Most of the focus 
of MP has been devoted to whether the answer would be negative or positive. I 
review the recent attempts that have tackled such a puzzle in order to suggest 
whether, on the basis of what we have obtained up to now, Molyneux’s 
question can be answered at all, by discussing the biological and experimental 
problems, and the related conceptual interpretations, standing in the way of a 
possible reliable empirical test. 
2. Different interpretations of MP 
A first important specification is about what the question is actually asking 
(Gallagher 2005; Ferretti 2017). We know that “Subjects must exhibit acuity 
sufficient to discriminate visually among the objects used for testing” (Held 
2009: 585). They have to be able to visually discriminate and identify shapes in 
a way that is sufficient for shape cross-modal matching (Schwenkler 2013: 92). 
So, it is one thing to ask the following question: 
 
(Q1) Can Molyneux subject see the shapes in question, so as to be able to make 
a sufficient ‘visual discrimination’ concerning the distinction between the 
shapes? 
It is another to ask this other question: 
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(Q2) In case the Molyneux subject can see the shapes in question, and is, thus, 
able to make a sufficient ‘visual discrimination’ concerning the distinction 
between the shapes - so as to “form robust representations of visual shape” 
(Schwenkler 2013: 93) - can she recognize the cube and the sphere? 
 
Q2 is the question at stake in MP (see the discussion by Gallagher 2005 of 
Degenaar 1996 and Evans 1985; see also Ferretti 2017). But asking Q2 requires 
a positive answer to Q1.1 The shrewd reader might be wondering about whether 
we can even answer Q1, a question grounded on further important 
specifications concerning sight restoration. The first thing to consider in 
answering Q1 is the existence of different forms of blindness. 
3. Different kinds of blindness 
Can we properly restore sight? When talking about restoration of sight (or 
vision),2 we need to explain what we mean by ‘sight’ so as to be clear about 
what we mean by its restoration. 
Vision is a complex phenomenon that can be analyzed at different levels 
and with respect to different tasks: colour vision, spatial vision, motion visual 
detection, etc. (Cattaneo and Vecchi 2011). To this extent, we can visually 
represent, in different manners, several aspects and properties of the visual 
scene. What does it mean, then, to obtain a proper answer to Q1 (which, 
remember, is the only one able to set us in the position to test Q2)? Having 
visual experience of some kind is not sufficient (though obtaining recovery of 
visual experience is not trivial from a biological point of view): “What is sight 
restoration? Certainly meaningless blobs of light should not be considered as 
such, but equally the ability to restore even relatively poor vision would be a 
triumph” (Fine et al. 2015). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Degenaar (1996) suggests a ‘no answer’ to MP based on a ‘no answer’ to Q1. I do not endorse 
this view here. A ‘no answer’ to Q1 does not mean a ‘no answer’ to MP, but just we lack proper 
biological and experimental conditions that meet the criteria to provide a positive answer, 
empirically testable, to Q1, which is the prerequisite to test Q2. Many attempts have suggested 
this way of reasoning (Gallagher 2005; Ferretti 2017). Crucial empirical tests supposed to 
suggest a negative answer to MP have been proven fallacious, for what they really provided a 
negative answer to was Q1 (§6).  
2 ‘Sight’ and ‘vision’ are used interchangeably here. 
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The process of visual shape recognition must be restored (here I use ‘visual 
shape recognition’ and ‘visual recognition’ as synonyms), so that the newly 
sighted subject can exhibit visual acuity sufficient to visually discriminate 
shapes (Held 2009: 585) thanks to the ability to form robust shape 
representations (Schwenkler 2013: 93). These recognitional capacities are 
needed for cross-modal matching (Schwenkler 2013: 92; for a review of this 
point see Ferretti 2017). This is not a trivial point: we can have a poor visual 
phenomenal experience of some aspects of the visual scene without recognizing 
the objects we are in front of (Milner and Goodale 1995/2006; Farah 2004). 
In order to further consider whether we can effectively answer Q1, we have 
to take a closer look at the nature of visual processing. Vision is only possible 
because of the complex functioning of our visual system whose processing is 
dependent on the specific interplay of the eyes and the visual cortex. Both of 
these two components are crucial in order to have visual experience in general 
and accurate object recognition in particular. The eyes absorb visual 
information from the environment. This visual information is then transmitted 
to the visual cortex, which manipulates it in order to give us visual experience 
of the external world (Milner and Goodale 1995/2006). (Of course, there are 
very specific portions of the visual cortex involved in visual object recognition 
we need to restore in order to properly answer to Q1. I’ll get back to this point 
below). To this extent, the reader should consider that there are two different 
kinds of blindness: ocular blindness and cortical blindness (Glenney 2013; Noë 
2004: 12; Ferretti 2017). The former depends on malfunctioning of ocular 
processing. The latter depends on malfunctioning of the cortical visual areas 
involved in visual processing. 
Suppose we have a case of congenital blindness due to the presence of 
cataracts. This problem seems to be, prima facie, related to ocular processing: 
cataracts mist up the lens of the eye and, thus, prevent several aspects of the 
spatial function of vision, like object recognition (luminance and color 
detection are still possible to some degree). Now, suppose that cataracts are 
removed through surgery. Arguably, ocular processing is thus restored: the eyes 
can correctly absorb the information coming from the external environment. 
One might argue that, in this case, the subject comes back to see, i.e. to perform 
correct visual recognition. Thus, we might be able to test MP, in the sense of 
Q2. After all, if cataracts are properly removed, the subject should be able to 
provide a positive answer to Q1. 
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Unfortunately, things are not so easy. This restoration does not guarantee 
restoration of sight, for restoring ocular processing from ocular blindness may 
not be sufficient to restore visual processing in its entirety: we should assure 
restored vision at the cortical level of visual processing3, which depends on the 
cortical development of the individual, i.e. on the fact that the visual cortex has 
been trained to perform one of its proper functions, namely, visual scene/object 
recognition, transforming the information provided by the light and filtered 
from the retina into visual experience related to recognition of things in the 
environment. Without the possibility of receiving information from the eyes, it 
is likely that our visual cortex has not been properly stimulated as it should be 
during the ontogenetic development: cortical visual processing has not 
undergone the proper training needed to develop its proper functioning in 
object recognition4, whose correct development is hugely based on the active 
coupling with the environment (Ferretti 2017). Furthermore, there is a specific 
period of recovery from which cortical visual processing involved in object 
recognition cannot be restored anymore (Gallagher 2005; Ferretti 2017). Thus, 
if we investigate Molyneux’s puzzle by using subjects who have not overcome 
the critical period, a possible positive answer might be, in principle, positive. 
But this only suggests that, after the critical period, visual restoration is not 
possible, while not excluding that, even before the critical period, achieving 
visual restoration may be very difficult. Cortical visual processing involved in 
visual recognition can’t be restored, in general, as easily as ocular processing 
can.5 Thus, even if ocular processing is ‘adjusted’ so as to function in an 
appropriate manner, the computations at the level of cortical visual processing 
might be still impaired, this leading to visual deficits in visual recognition 
(Ferretti 2017: Sect. 6; Barrett and Bar 2009: 1325). 
Even when ocular processing is restored, the subject shows the same visual 
impairment as brain-damaged subjects with different lesions of the visual 
cortex (see Gallagher 2005; Ferretti 2017), in particular, those with specific 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 There might be ocular blindness even if the cortical visual processing is functioning. 
4 I do not offer any teleosemantic definition of the proper function of the activity of the visual 
cortex (Millikan 1984). I just focus on one of the most crucial activities it subserves in humans 
and other animals: visual object recognition (Milner and Goodale 1995/2006). 
5 Cataracts prevent several aspects of the spatial function of vision, like object recognition, 
while, however, luminance and color detection are still possible (this meaning that, in this 
situation, ocular and cortical visual processing are not completely impaired, but their 
performance of object recognition is).  
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forms of visual agnosia, an impairment in visual recognition (Ferretti 2017, §6). 
In some cases, a corneal transplant might restore the possibility to absorb visual 
information from the environment that can be then sent to the visual brain 
(Barrett and Bar 2009: 1325 of Fine et al. 2003), while inactivation of the areas 
involved in visual processing can persist even after a long time (Fine et al. 
2003: 915). Research on early visual deprivation from cataract (and even on 
permanent blindness) suggests that early sensory inputs are crucial for the 
functional organization of the visual cortex: “when visual input is delayed until 
cataracts are removed, there is only partial recovery of visual capabilities” 
(Maurer et al. 2005: 144). 
Someone might suggest restoring ocular processing before we lose the 
opportunity for cortical visual processing to perform its proper function. But, 
things become more complicated because there exists other problems we have 
to consider concerning the possibility of visual restoration, which I will address 
below. Before this discussion, there is an important specification I need to 
make. 
Since we might distinguish, in principle, between two forms of blindness, 
i.e. ocular and cortical blindness, we can also consider two kinds of restoration. 
And since the visual system is a complex machine, restoring ocular processing 
might not be sufficient to restore visual brain processing. Thus, restoration from 
ocular blindness will not provide a subject with ‘proper’ visual recognition. 
I’ve been using the notion of ‘restoration’ of visual processing involved in 
visual recognition broadly. Now I discuss the conceptual problems related to 
the experimental practice which stand in the way of a possible reliable test 
specifically regarding a scenario in which ocular processing is restored before 
the critical period of deterioration of the proper function of cortical visual 
processing. 
4. Biological and experimental constraints on visual restoration 
Investigating the puzzle at stake requires following a crucial constraint: at the 
time of the experiment vision must be known to be successfully restored, or 
what is taken to be a negative answer to MP is, indeed, a proof that we have not 
reached the scenario that allows us to properly test the puzzle. In other words, a 
negative answer to Q1 undermines a test of Q2, thought it might be taken as 
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leading, mistakenly, to a negative answer to Q2.6 This is something that has 
frequently happened in the experimental practice aimed at tackling MP 
(Jacomuzzi et al. 2003; Schwenkler 2013; Gallagher 2005; Glenney 2013; 
Ferretti 2017). 
Restoration presents several problems. For one, vision scientists suggest 
that the test be performed “as soon after surgery as possible - ideally when 
bandages are first removed” (Held 2009: 595). This would exclude acquisition 
of visual capacities by experience. However, for different reasons, restoration is 
never immediate but slow and, in most of the cases, cannot be complete, even 
after a long time period (Jacomuzzi et al. 2003: 260-262; Fine 2003; Smith 
2000: 497). Also, in the critical period of recovery we cannot distinguish 
between optical problems due to the post-operative traumas and the effects of 
perceptual learning (Jacomuzzi et al. 2003: 262). Furthermore, several visual 
problems at the computational neurophysiological level (Gallagher 2005; 
Degenaar 1996; Ferretti 2017; Smith 2000) “persisted after as much as 4 
months, and, in one case, even after 1 year” (Jacomuzzi et al. 2003: 260). There 
are also different times related to different visual recoveries in relation to 
different visual impairments (Ostrovsky et al. 2006; Lewis and Maurer 2005; 
Maurer et al. 2005; see also the data recollected from Project Prakash: 
(Thomas 2011). To this extent, it has been clearly shown that “visual recovery 
after blindness that occurs early in life is never complete.” Thus, several 
problems related to visual memory, visual organization, shape and face 
recognition, and simultaneous processing of visual information are present (Šikl 
et al. 2013: 498). Crucially, even in a case where vision was almost sufficiently 
and almost suddenly restored, allowing to test the subject not long after the 
surgery (Held et al. 2011; Held 2009), the arrangement of the experimental 
setting has been judged inadequate (Schwenkler 2013, §6). 
This suggests that the possibility of successful restoration of visual 
processing is the most insidious and problematic aspect standing in the way of 
an answer to MP. But, the reader might not want to give up, and may invoke the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 There might be variants of MP, investigated with different methodologies (for example, the 
case of sensory substitution devices (Jacomuzzi et al. 2003: 270) or the case of phosphene 
perception (Evans 1979)), for which it seems that the negative answer to Q1 does not entail a 
negative answer to Q2. Here I do not consider these ‘many lives of Molyneux’s question’ 
(Glenney 2013: 541) their constraints and their implications. I thank an anonymous reviewer for 
suggesting me to add this important point. 
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methodological claim that testing whether cross-modal matching is possible at 
first sight depends on what we mean by ‘at first sight’. Arguably, the test 
should be done provided that the subject has visual recognition restored when, 
at first sight, she is asked to judge. Can this condition be satisfied? We saw 
there are several problems. This condition is unlikely to be met if we want that 
recognition at first sight coincides with the first sight the individual can take 
soon after bandage removal. So, we should grant more time for visual recovery. 
Thus, maybe the constraint that the test should be performed “as soon after 
surgery as possible” (Held 2009: 595) is too demanding and strong. Call this 
the constraint concerning temporal immediacy. We might decide to use another 
constraint, the one called of epistemological immediacy, introduced by Levin 
(2008; for discussion see also Glenney 2013; Ferretti 2017). We should allow 
the subject to heal “between visual restoration and shape recognition, while 
assuring, through controls, that subjects remain experientially and inferentially 
naive regarding identifying shapes by sight alone” (Glenney 2013: 460). 
Unfortunately, what seems to be a more reasonable constraint on restoration 
might be very hard to apply. Levin’s epistemic criterion aims to avoid the 
numerous problems associated with the possibility of visual restoration by 
allowing subjects to heal, without allowing them to develop perceptual 
learning. However, several philosophical analysis and experimental practices 
suggested this is something very hard to obtain: we don’t dispose of a criterion 
that guarantees complete healing of the visual system without the risk of 
acquisition of perceptual learning (Jacomuzzi et al. 2003; Ferretti 2017). For 
example, we need to remove the bandage from the subject’s eyes after the 
surgery, in order to allow her visual system to absorb visual information so to 
initiate the process of reacquisition of the capacity to manage the visual input 
from the environment. But we can’t exclude the possibility that right after 
bandage removal there will be a perceptual learning that marches in step with 
the recovery of the physiological function of the visual system. Indeed, that 
there are no satisfying controls allowing to manage whether, soon after the 
operation (and bandage removal) visual processing functions in such a way due 
to full (optical and cortical) visual restoration or due to learning experience 
(Jacomuzzi et al. 2003; Gallagher 2005; Ferretti 2017: Sect. 3). It is also very 
difficult to exclude the possibility that “simple world exposure” (Held et al. 
2011) does not foster perceptual learning. In certain cases, visual processing 
might not be completely restored, but might have begun to become minimally 
 G. Ferretti – Molyneux’s Puzzle 
	  
 
 
Periodico	  On-­‐line	  /	  ISSN	  2036-­‐9972	     
  
functioning. But restoration might also take so long so as to be impossible to 
offer a very meticulous observation and control on the subjects. 
For these reasons, the default experimental practice employs temporal 
immediacy (e.g. Held et al. 2011): as soon after surgery as possible, ideally 
when bandages are first removed (Held 2009: 595). However, as I discuss in 
Section 6, it has been argued that these subjects were not ready for the 
discrimination test, even if they had been judged to have sight (Schwenkler 
2013). 
5. Q1, Q2 and restoration 
The literature from vision science, as well as the philosophical reflection about 
the empirical results provided by such a literature, seem to suggest that we are 
not in the position to obtain a positive answer to Q1, and, thus, to reliably test 
Q2. If the subjects being tested have some visual experience, it is judged too 
poor; they are not in a condition for performing robust visual discriminations 
for shape recognition. In some cases, patients describe a cube as “a square with 
lines” (Fine 2003: 915) and seem to possess a “limited capacity to form 3D 
visual representations of complex objects” (Schwenkler 2015). Problems in the 
3D interpretation of retinal images is also present (Fine 2003: 915). In certain 
cases, after cataract removal, all visual experience seems to be mixed up and 
blurred in the visual scene (Sacks 1995: 114; cfr. with Noë 2004: 5). 
While “causes for failing to recognize shapes may be due to residual effects 
of either optical or cognitive blindness” (Glenney 2013: 544) - blind subjects 
can be ‘double blind’: perceptually and cognitively (Noë 2004: 12) - visual 
processing presents several stages (Downing et al. 2006), and so visual 
problems might occur at any different stage of the computational visual 
processing (Glenney 2013; Ferretti 2017): “The number of ways to see and the 
variety of kinds of visual deprivation all directly related to the physical level 
alone suggest that there are a number of ways in which the newly sighted might 
both succeed and fail in shape recognition” (Glenney 2013: 544). All this to 
say, there are several experimental settings used to test Molyneux’s puzzle and 
related debates about which is the best experimental paradigm and best kind of 
subject for such a paradigm (Jacomuzzi et al. 2003). 
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Unfortunately, subjects involved in the test show several problems both at 
the ocular level and at the different stages of the cortical visual processing (for 
a review see Jacomuzzi et al. 2003; Gallagher 2005; Ferretti 2017). 
6. What we can(’t) do at the moment 
Here is a recent crucial experiment. Held et al. (2011) tested, after ocular sight 
restoration, the ability of some patients “to visually match an object to a 
haptically sensed sample after sight restoration” (p. 551). The study is supposed 
to show, as the title says, that “newly sighted fail to match seen with felt”, 
because immediate cross-modal transfer is impossible before perceptual 
learning (and it develops after a few days with real world contact) (p. 552). This 
seems to suggest that vision and touch are not linked before experience so as to 
allow to perform cross-modal recognition. 
Schwenkler (2013) suggested that the negative result might be due to 
problems with the experimental setting, which does not allow the subjects to 
recover robust 3-D shape representations7. Thus, instead of providing an answer 
to MP, this study only suggests that vision is not completely restored: subjects 
can attend to “low-level visual features like colour, shadow and approximate 
overall contours” (p. 91), without having “robust shape representations that 
could be compared across modalities” (Id.) Therefore, this study only seems to 
suggest that we have to carefully pay attention to the constraints imposed by 
such a very sharp puzzle: the test only shows that we do not have a positive 
response to Q1. But, as argued above, such a response is a prerequisite to test 
Q28. 
Schwenkler proposed to “re-run Held and colleagues’ experiment with the 
stimulus objects made to move, and/or the subjects moved or permitted to move 
with respect to them” (Schwenkler 2013: 94). This, arguably, might help the 
subjects build proper shape representations (Schwenkler 2013: 94 of Fine et al. 
2003: 915; Ostrovsky et al. 2009: 1489). 
But things are not so easy. Connolly (2013) suggests that allowing the 
subjects to move around the shapes is not sufficient to improve the experiment. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 For a discussion of similar experimental scenarios see (Gregory 2003; Ostrovsky et al. 2006; 
Glenney 2013: 548; Jacomuzzi et al. 2003: 259-262). 
8 See footnote 6. 
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Indeed, the subjects’ visual systems likely cannot properly process depth 
properties of objects. 
Schwenkler also suggested another way to re-run the experiment: using 
planar shapes instead of 3-D objects. This proposal is, according to Connolly, 
feasible. However, Cheng (2015) suggests that this is very problematic and that, 
maybe, testing the puzzle reliably might be harder than previously thought, thus 
leaving open the experimental question of whether we can build a reliable 
experimental test. Accordingly, Clarke (2016) suggests that subjects might 
present several problems concerning not only recognitional visual processing, 
but also the inferences that allow the formation of the perceptual beliefs related 
to visual recognition. 
In a previous work, I have suggested (Ferretti 2017) that we should analyze 
MP in the light of our most recent and influential account from vision science 
of how our visual system works, ‘The Two Visual Systems Model’ (Milner and 
Goodale 1995/2006), which suggests the hodological separation of our visual 
brain in (at least) two main visual streams: a ventral stream that subserves 
conscious visual recognition and a dorsal stream that subserves unconsciously 
guided action. The analysis of MP based on this model considered not only the 
classic MP, but also another formulation of it concerning vision-for-action, 
which asks about whether Molyneux’s subject would be able to grasp the object 
‘at first sight’. This contribution suggests that, due to the lack of proper 
ontogenetic development, the subjects of Molyneux’s two different questions 
show the same visual impairment as brain-damaged subjects with different 
lesions of the visual cortex: the subject of MP shows the same impairment in 
visual recognition as a visual agnosic subject, while the subject of the question 
concerning vision-for-action shows the same visual impairment in visuomotor 
processing as an optic ataxic subject9. Taking into account the difference 
between ocular and cortical blindness suggests that these impairments still hold, 
even if ocular processing is restored. Therefore, without the possibility of an 
answer to Q1, the required experimental setting for Q2 cannot be properly 
reached. Thus, the answer to Q2, based on the interpretation we select, is either 
negative or the experimental setting cannot be properly reached, making Q2 
experimentally null. This is in line with several findings showing that, though 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 It is also pointed out the extent to which, in answering MP, we can take into account the 
degree of possible anatomo-functional dissociation and cooperation between the streams, whose 
nature is fueling the contemporary debate on vision. 
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our visual brain is very plastic, completely restoring dorsal and ventral 
processing in a perfect manner after blindness might be very hard, especially 
after the critical period (Maurer et al. 2005). 
The presence of experimental problems due to the restoration of visual 
processing is not new (see Degenaar 1996; Gallagher 2005). Sensorimotor 
theorists also suggested that, since vision is a form of action, sight can be 
restored only if a subject is also provided with the possibility of performing a 
dynamic and active exploration of the environment (Noë 2004: Sect. 3.8). But 
this would violate the constraint of an immediate test after bandage removal, 
which is aimed at avoiding perceptual learning. Indeed, even the minimal 
“simple world exposure” (Held et al. 2011) fosters perceptual learning, 
especially in the case of periods of high plasticity before the critical period (§3). 
Sight restoration might be provided only by allowing the use of methodological 
constraints which, however, should not be permitted if we want the experiment 
to be informative for MP (Schwenkler 2013: 89). 
In a recent experiment by Chen et al. (2016), a 44-month-old child with 
congenital cataracts, who underwent cataract removal surgery and intraocular 
lens implantation for both eyes, was tested immediately after bandage removal 
(in line with the suggestion by Held 2009). The results show that the visual 
capacities of the child develop surprisingly fast concerning both visual 
recognition and visually guided action. However, this result is not very relevant 
for the investigation of the MP (Ferretti 2017: 7.4), (not even by following the 
constraint of epistemological immediacy) for it only shows that, within the 
period of high neuroplasticity, object recognition and visuomotor performance 
can be both developed very rapidly (Chen et al. 2016: 1071, 1072), in line with 
other studies confirming that, in the case of high neuroplasticity, development 
of vision is very fast (Held 2009; Lungarella and Sporns 2006). So, this study 
shows, at best, the quick recovery of visual capacities by allowing for sight to 
interact with touch, something that is forbidden if we want to properly 
investigate MP itself. 
7. Conclusions 
Several problems prevent us from finding an empirical solution to MP, 
especially a failure to realize an acceptable experimental scenario. 
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One outcome of the experimental stalemate is that MP will remain a 
thought experiment whose conditions exclude it from our laboratories. Or 
maybe we do not have the correct conceptual distinctions at the basis of our 
experimental practice, which is often theory-laden. 
This leaves room for a priori reasoning about MP. We might imagine the 
different scenarios of sight opened by such a conundrum, even if a proper 
answer supported by a naturalistic approach is still unavailable. We might still 
try to figure out a possible answer in case the conditions of visual restoration 
become accessible. We could also imagine possible worlds, with different 
creatures, much simpler than human beings, whose vision is so elementary that 
we can know the conditions of complete and immediate restoration10. We might 
also think of an ‘ideal’ situation in which the subject would not have the several 
problems suggested by the empirical analysis. In this situation, we might think, 
this ‘ideal’ subject would be able to positively answer MP (Gallagher 2005). 
Here the discussion was limited to the situation we can reach following the 
neurophysiology of vision, insofar as using a naïve, pre-experimental notion of 
‘vision’ cannot take into account the conundrum at stake here, insofar as it does 
not capture the complex nature of human visual neurophysiology. But even 
doing so, tackling such a problem still remains very difficult, given the 
numerous conceptual constraints is requires. It has even been suggested that a 
miraculous healing, as the famous one made by Jesus, could not produce a 
perfect Molyneux subject (Glenney and Noble 2014). 
Crucially, the interplay between analytic philosophy and vision science is 
crucial to understand what it means to restore ‘vision’. Answering MP by 
assuming, against the evidence, that the very complex phenomenon of vision 
can be completely and immediately restored on the basis of an anti-empirical 
assumption is thus improper. We cannot proceed a priori avoiding the 
empirical facts that suggest that the situation we are looking for can be hardly 
obtained: “it would be a mistake to think that those who know nothing of the 
science of the mind can just stick to the relatively a priori parts of philosophy of 
mind, since one needs to understand the empirical facts to even know where 
there is room for relatively a priori philosophy” (Block 2014: 570-571). 
Without direct evidence that the scenario requested is reachable, we can 
still tackle MP by using what vision science has taught us up to now.	  However, 
the final solution appears hostage to a conceptually well-regimented empirical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 For a similar point see Grice (1962/2011) on ‘alien organs’. 
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test.11 To conclude, the debate remains open concerning both the original 
question and the new ways to tackle it, as well as its possible new formulations, 
which will serve as basis to understand what we really know about vision (see 
Ferretti and Glenney, Under Contract). 
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